Case Law Every Cop Should Be Familiar With

An Introduction to Police Case Law

When the Supreme Court or other appellate court issues an opinion that addresses an area of criminal or civil procedure, it becomes binding precedent for all courts in the state and is followed in all cases in the state unless a later binding opinion overrules it. The case law in California is vast. Penal Code sections are voluminous and often seem to refer to hundreds of cases just to provide black letter law and illustrate how it has been handled in other circumstances.
What all this means is that when a police officer makes an arrest or writes a citation , there is case law that applies. Most police officers are not aware of these cases or their vast number. There is still that pesky question of, "How does that work?" Case law comes into effect because the plain language of the code section does not address every possible scenario that could arise. These code sections, when combined with the case law, explains exactly what the officer is required to do, and what may be overlooked, depending on the factors involved. It can be a blessing or a curse, depending on the situation and how those police department policies and practices are applied.
In our next post, we profile two essential cases every police officer should know.

Key Supreme Court Rulings Impacting Law Enforcement

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
Arguably the most significant case in American police history, Miranda v. Arizona held that the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against self-incrimination requires law enforcement to inform arrestees of their right to remain silent, the right to an attorney, and that any statements they make may be used against them during prosecution. The Court reversed three convictions after the defendants were interrogated by police and confessed without being advised of their rights. Now referred to as the "Miranda warning", this critical step in the arrest process is required almost universally today and should be fully understood by police officers.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
Another critical case for police officers, Terry involved a pat down search of three individuals on a Cleveland street who a police officer stopped due to suspicious behavior. The officer, John W. McFadden, was not in uniform but conducting a routine patrol. He approached the men, identified himself as a police officer, and asked if he could talk with them. The three agreed, but not willingly – McFadden saw one of the men reach in his pocket as he approached, then suspecting the men might be armed, he searched the individuals. Terry and one of the other defendants were found to be carrying loaded handguns and the pair was arrested. They argued that the stop and search was unlawful, but the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court ruled that under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may briefly stop and question a person in a public place even without probable cause for an arrest if the officer believes that the person is acting suspiciously and has committed or is about to commit a crime. In addition, the Court added that the officer may conduct a limited protective search for weapons (a "frisk") if the officer reasonably believes the person may be armed and dangerous.
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)
The Mimms decision solidified the practice of having drivers exit their vehicles during traffic stops. The Court held that requiring a driver to get out of a vehicle for a brief time during a lawful traffic stop does not constitute an unreasonable seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In Mimms, the officer performed a Terry-like stop on a driver for driving with an expired license plate. The officer asked the driver to exit the vehicle, then discovered a firearm underneath the driver’s jacket. The Court upheld Mimms’ conviction after holding that the officer’s orders to exit the vehicle were proper.
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that a police officer who has made a lawful arrest of a vehicle’s occupant may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle without further justification. The search includes containers and compartments within the passenger compartment that may contain a weapon or evidence of a crime. Officers conducted a warrantless search of Belton’s car and its occupants, and found cocaine in a jacket within the passenger compartment. Belton was convicted of criminal possession of a narcotic drug after the search. The Court held that police officers may conduct a search of a vehicle, incident to a lawful arrest, in order to protect themselves and to prevent destruction of evidence. That rule created by this case has been expanded over the years, with the most significant expansion coming in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), which held that a vehicle search incident to arrest is justified only if it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)
The Supreme Court set a high bar for establishing a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment due to an officer’s actions, or lack thereof, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis. A passenger on a motorcycle, responding officer Parker Lewis observed another motorcyclist traveling at a very high rate of speed. Parker attempted to catch the motorcycle, which was operated at a speed that averaged 114 miles per hour over a period of about 40 seconds. Parker chased the motorcycle, whose driver reached speeds of approximately 100 mph, before concluding that he would not be able to apprehend the motorcycle. Parker turned off his patrol lights and went to prepare a ticket for the motorcycle. Parker left the scene prior to thinking that the other officer might need assistance. Meanwhile, the motorcycle crashed, killing the motorist, Glen Dean Williams. Williams’ parents sued Parker for violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to substantive due process. The Supreme Court denied that claim.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)
The Supreme Court ruled in Graham that excessive use of force claims brought under the Fourth Amendment are governed by an objective reasonableness standard. In Graham, an officer stopped Graham to check his vitals after observing him acting strangely in a convenience store. Graham explained that he was suffering from a diabetic attack and needed to go home, but the officer assumed that Graham was trying to rob the store. The officer called for back-up, then several officers tackled Graham, injuring him and then leaving him bleeding and unconscious in a patrol car for more than 30 minutes. Graham sustained serious injuries, and filed a lawsuit under Section 1983 of the United States Code, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court agreed with Graham.

Search and Seizure – The Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and many states have similar provisions in their constitutions. It is generally agreed that entering the home of a citizen to execute an arrest warrant or search warrant constitutes a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment, and in his (or her) 1967 opinion in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, the U.S. Supreme Court held: "A warrantless entry to make a routine felony arrest in the home of a suspect, one of the few strictly limited exceptions to the general rule that the police may not enter the home without a warrant, is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." The Court went on to hold that the same result would occur if the police had entered the defendant’s home to execute a search warrant. The Court based its analysis on the plain language of the Fourth Amendment, which: ‘[W]as intended to prevent wholesale entry of the police into a dwelling without a warrant. . . . [I]t is also meant to protect the ‘right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’ [Citations omitted.] ‘Within the confines of his house, he has a host of liberty interests that do not rise to the level of fundamental rights but nonetheless warrant the Fourth Amendment’s concern.’ [Citations omitted.] In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 126 S. Ct. 2159, where it held that the formal application of the exclusionary rule — i.e., the suppression (incriminating) evidence that officers have found — is not an appropriate remedy in cases where an officer (erroneously) violates a knock and announce provision in executing a no-knock search warrant. This was a very close case decided 5-4 (the dissenting justices felt that the "knock-and-announce" principle is a very old and cherished principle in Anglo-American law and that, being "deeply rooted in our precedents," it should be "adequately enforced by the sanction of suppressed evidence"). So a conflict does exist concerning the actual application of the rule by courts in different states. We feel that fact patterns relating to situations involving citizens’ homes, and search warrants are very instructive in understanding the Fourth Amendment and its application in the real world. We are confident that you will be able to properly apply your training with a written policy that has been created based on thorough and exhaustive research of all the case law and our understanding of the Fourth Amendment principles.

Use of Force – A Look at the Legal Precedents

In determining the reasonableness or legality of the force applied, we must look to the case law to determine how the legal solution fits the facts. The seminal case that determines whether officers acted objectively reasonable is Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). Graham reiterated that "all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop or other ‘seizure’ of a person are to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard." Id. at 395. The proper application of the ‘reasonable’ standard in an excessive force case requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. at 396.
The first factor, the severity of the crime at issue, may seem obvious. But not every situation is so clear-cut. If a suspect shoplifts a $5 candy bar, but is in a vehicle with a shotgun in a high crime area, factors two and three become much more relevant in determining the reasonableness of force and detention. If a suspect shoplifts a $5 candy bar and, in response to the store employee who confronts him, brushes by her and gets into a tug-of-war over the candy bar, it is much more likely that the second and third factors (immediate threat and active resistance) will be relevant to determining whether force was necessary in the arrest and whether the arrest was supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
With respect to the second and third factors, the degree of threat posed to police officers or the public is an objective determination: "Whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the officer or others is judged at the moment that force was used and from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene with the perspective to assess the situation." Thomas v. Dillard, 315 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003). In other words, Graham requires an officer to make a split second decision in a high tension circumstance; if the officer reasonably believes that a suspect poses an immediate threat to his or her safety at the time the officer used force, the officer’s use of force is not excessive, no matter how it appears with the benefit of hindsight. Cf, Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372 (2007) (Officers escape the 20/20 vision of hindsight by adopting their perspective at the time. That perspective includes the officer’s perception of the suspect’s reckless driving at the time of the act, which posed an immediate threat to them as well as other Vehicles.)
Another important consideration in determining the reasonableness of an officer’s actions is the training and policies of the department. The policy should provide guidance as to when an officer may use reasonable force, as well as which intermediate level of force is appropriate for each situation. If the officer fails to follow these policies, this will be relevant to whether the officer acted within the scope of his duties.

When is Interrogation Legal?

In their pursuit of effective law enforcement, detectives and investigators often rely on interrogation techniques to extract truthful information from suspects. However, the manner in which these interrogations are conducted is heavily scrutinized in the courts, and case law has established a framework for what is and is not permissible during these critical encounters.
In the landmark 1969 case Frazier v. Cupp, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of voluntariness in confessions, holding that a confession obtained after statements designed to mislead and confuse the suspect as to the evidence against him could be admissible in court. The ruling made it clear that deception did not, on its own, constitute coercion if the confession was otherwise voluntary.
In addition to the concerns about voluntariness, the Supreme Court also addressed the issue of outside influences on a suspect’s decision to confess in the case of Colorado v. Connelly in 1986. Over the years, several courts at various levels have attempted to define exactly when a confession is voluntary and when it is not, but there is no consensus on precisely how much coercion is too much coercion. Any law enforcement officer relying on case law to inform his or her decisions with regard to confessions and interrogations would do well to remember the language in Frazier that made the Court reluctant "to impose on private parties the burden of observing legal milestones like the police themselves must observe."
While these two cases are the most commonly cited by police officers and examiners asking about legal boundaries on confession techniques, they are not the only influential cases. In both Spano v. New York (1959) and Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), the Supreme Court addressed confessions obtained outside the scope or in violation of a suspect’s right to counsel. More recent cases, including Snook v. Toney (2002), have discussed his rights as well. No matter how frequently case law has addressed the issue and no matter how clear the rulings may seem, the simple fact remains that coerced confession techniques may actually be more acceptable than many officers believe. Because case law provides little in the way of bright-line rules from which officers must operate, it is essential for officers in the field to familiarize themselves with the language of the Frazier and Connelly cases, even if the guidelines present by these cases are not hard and fast.
Case law aside, the constitutional protections afforded to defendants in interrogations are set forth in Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 5(a) of the United States Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that any individual arrested must be brought before the issuing or committing court without necessary delay. Rule 5(b) protects the accused’s right to counsel. Rule 5(c) ensures that a defendant is informed of the nature of the accusations.
Because case law and procedural rules provide only vague guidance on the permissible use of coercive interrogation techniques, officers are best advised to err on the side of caution. To limit the potential for judicial intervention and the loss of key pieces of evidence, they should ensure that a suspect has been fully informed of his or her rights before any interrogation begins. Officers should also avoid using coercion, even of the non-physical form, when investigating criminal acts.

Racial Profiling and Case Law Issues

The intertwining of racial profiling and policing has given rise to a number of significant and contentious battles. These legal disputes have addressed whether a traffic stop or other law enforcement action was motivated by race, leading to a determination of whether the action constituted an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, or discriminatory action under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the landmark case of Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the Supreme Court resolved this conflict, ruling that if police evidence demonstrates probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred, the motive behind the traffic stop is irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether the stop was lawful, because a valid stop has occurred thus leading to a valid seizure . The continued application of some of these cases has led to litigation regarding the search of vehicles and individuals after encounters with police that officers did not consider to be a seizure, but courts found to have been a seizure nonetheless. Under such circumstances, law enforcement is even more inclined to conduct a lawful stop and ensure any subsequent contact is based upon independent facts that establish probable cause, before proceeding with the development of their case or engaging in questioning an individual. At a minimum, however, the litany of cases that have addressed these issues reinforces why the importance of the documentation of all facts surrounding any police encounter with an individual, including detailed Temporary Detention Reports, is of paramount importance to mitigate liability concerns.

Technology and Law in Policing

Essential case law dictating the use of contemporary technologies can be found in Supreme Court cases as well. An important case is Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), which involved the United States’ use of thermal imaging technology to detect relatively high levels of heat emanating from the structure. Since the device in this case was primarily directed at the home, the government’s use of the device without a warrant or probable cause violated Kyllo’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court noted that "its judgment regarding the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s coverage is dictated by precedent known to the tradition of the Fourth Amendment itself" and "the Fourth Amendment’s protection of the ‘effects’ against the Government’s ‘unreasonable searches’ covers the interior of homes" and "holds that official intrusion into a home that passes beyond the threshold requires a warrant." The Kyllo decision was relatively easy for the Court because the subject was an interior space of one’s home. No one would argue that utilizing such technology to gather information about what a person is doing inside their home is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment without a warrant.
Applying Kyllo to require a warrant for searches of non-traditional spaces would be extremely problematic, as our legal system operates on an understanding that the interior of a home is afforded heightened privacy. But in other spaces, courts have reasoned that the use of some technology does not amount to a search requiring a warrant. For example, in United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), a drug-detecting dog "sniffed" a package that had been delivered by FedEx and was deemed not to constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. But in Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013), the Court held that a drug-detecting dog has probable cause only if it produces satisfactory evidence of a "substantial chance" that the item the dog alerted to contained narcotics. People cannot be searched without probable cause or a warrant.
United States v. Maynard, 654 F.3d 544 (2010) concerned a GPS device attached to the bumper of a car, which monitored the movements of the suspect. The device was attached to the car without a warrant, in an amount exceeding 14 days. The court reasoned that the "long-term monitoring of the movements of every vehicle on a public road reveals a great deal of detail — a comprehensive, constantly updating record of a person’s public movements." The Supreme Court has yet to fully answer the question of whether emerging forms of surveillance technology, like location tracking devices, should be treated as a search requiring a warrant. But in Maynard, the Court avoided the difficult issue of whether location tracking was a search, and instead regarded it as a "search" under Kyllo because the suspected amount of time that the GPS device provided location data exceeded 27 days.

Why Police Should Follow Positive Case Law

It is critical that officers stay abreast of recent case law developments for two main reasons. First, you need to be sure that your department and/or division is in compliance with Fourth and Fifth Amendment case law. Officers need to be in a position to advise their appropriate chain of command of significant new developments.
Second, as we have previously discussed, you should be studying recent search and seizure cases because the U.S. Supreme Court is trending in a pro-police direction. You should be aware of recent decisions so that you can continue to do the job of protecting and serving while simultaneously being as compliant with the law as possible. This can be accomplished when you stay on top of recent case law precedents and apply that knowledge in the field on a day to day basis. In addition to making you more knowledgeable, this practice will make you a better officer. The best officers make the best supervisors, and the best supervisors make the best Chiefs and Sheriffs.

Conclusion: The Relevance of Positive Police Case Law

As this article has outlined, the body of case law that emerges from the routine landscape of police work is not only essential for an officer to know, but is also fascinating and nuanced. There is a common thread, however, that can easily be overlooked by us all in the bustle of day-to-day policing, but should remain an officer’s primary focus at all times — responsibility. Police officers have an affirmative duty to understand the case law that constrains or guides their actions in any given situation. Failure to understand the law can lead to First Amendment infringements and unjustified arrests, as well as negligence claims against the department. The repercussions of acting without an understanding of the law can be far-reaching. And so the cycle continues. Bad actors generate liability claims, which create additional case law. Officers who do not bother to keep up with the ever-changing case law inevitably will continue to repeat the same mistakes and the cycle will repeat itself . It may seem like an impossible cycle to break but in truth, the modern day officer has access to more legal resources than ever before. While it may sound intimidating to read Supreme Court and Appellate court opinions, it is the reality of policing. And with the advent of smart phones and easy access to legal resources, police officers simply must stay up to date on relevant case law and bear the responsibility of differentiating bad case law from good case law. The fact is that educated officers are better officers. Being an educated officer translates into more effective policing, greater individual and departmental accountability, and a greater understanding of the legal implications of everyday policing decisions. In turn, if we can break the cycle of ill-informed policing and create a culture of educated policing, we are less likely to see new case law that erodes constitutional protections.